你知道如何辨别真假信息吗？我的另类翻译之旅032
【絮语】
本小节的标题，其实应该是“判断写作者论证的可靠性”。
这个“可靠性”，在书中用的是“ soundness ”。 Soundness 有多种用法，列示如下：
n.
1.完好；健全；稳健，确实。
2.坚固；公正，正当。
3.坚固性，坚固度。
你会发现，其实在词典中，是没有可靠性这个定义的。翻译为可靠性的，一般是 reliability 这个单词。
但为什么我要在此译为“可靠性”呢？
事实上，我认为，这是逻辑学中的中文专有名词。
从逻辑学角度，一个理论应该从两个方面考察，一是可靠性，二是完备性（ completeness ）。本小节讨论的是可靠性，下一小节，讨论的是完备性。
所谓论证的可靠性，又包含两个条件，二者缺一不可：
一是前提必须为真；
二是论证形式必须有效（ valid ）或正确（ correct ）。有效是针对演绎上的论证而言，正确，是针对归纳上的论证而言。
这些知识其实我们在中学时就学习过。
我们得到的教育，是说写议论文或阅读议论文体，必须关注两个方面，一是论据，二是论证方法，实际上就是前提与论证形式。
所谓评判一本书的四个方面，或者发表评论的四种类型，其实都是以上述逻辑学知识为基础，逐一展开的。
前面两点，“不了解情况”是指遗漏或忽视证据；“信息有误”，是指前提为假。此二者均为评判“前提是否为真？”。
第三点，“不合逻辑”，主要是指无效或错误的论证形式。
第四点，则是考察完备性的，这一点下一小节再讲。
顺便提一句，我阅读《如何阅读一本书》第一遍时，恰好还没有学习逻辑。现在学习了逻辑，虽然还在学习中，前后对比阅读《如何阅读一本书》的感受，仿佛在阅读另外一本书，理解完全不一样。由此可见学习逻辑对于学习本身的重要性。因为学习离不开阅读，而阅读离不开逻辑——任何书籍，逻辑都无处不在。
【翻译正文】
判断作者的可靠性（ soundness ）
如我们现在所看到的，这前面三种评论意见与第四种稍有不同。让我们简要地考察一下此三种评论中的每一种情况，然后再来考察第四种。
1、说一位写作者不了解情况，是说对于想要解决的问题，他缺乏与之相关的一些知识（或信息）。在此请注意，除非这些知识，应该是一旦被写作者掌握，就与解决目标问题相关，否则，作出此类评论没有任何意义。为支持该评判，你必须能够自己表述作者缺失的此类知识，并展示该知识如何与目标问题相关，以及如何导致与写作者结论的差异。
在此只需少量示例即可说明。达尔文缺乏遗传学的相关知识，这些知识现在已由孟德尔（Gregor Johann Mendel）以及后续实验者的工作提供。达尔文在遗传机制上的无知，是《物种起源》的主要缺陷。吉本（Gibbon）对某些事实缺乏了解，后来的历史发现显示出，这些事实与罗马帝国衰亡存在关联。通常来说，在科学与历史方面，后来的研究者总会发现或挖掘出前人某些信息的缺失。大多数情况下，此类信息缺失的发现，都是因为不断改进的观察技术和长时间的研究调查导致的。不过，在哲学领域，信息缺失的发现，可能由于其他因素。随着时间流逝，所得与所失，似乎同步进行。举个例子，在古代，人类能够感觉和想像的东西，与人类能够理解的东西之间的区别清清楚楚。然而，在十八世纪，大卫·休谟（David Hume）显露了他对于印象（images）与观念（ideas）二者区别的无知①，尽管二者的区别已被早期哲学家的工作充分确立。
译者注：
① 对于“印象”与“观念”之间的区别问题，罗素在他的《西方哲学史》谈到了休谟的无知是什么：
他开始先讲“印象”和“观念”的区别。它们是两类知觉，其中印象是具有较多的力量和猛烈性的知觉。“我所谓的观念，意思指思考和推理中的印象的模糊心像。”观念，至少就单纯观念的情况说，和印象是类似的，但是比印象模糊。“一切单纯观念都有一个单纯印象，和它相似；而一切单纯印象都有一个相应的观念。”“我们的所有单纯观念与在首次出现时全是由单纯印象来的，这种单纯印象与该单纯观念相应，而该单纯观念确切代表这种单纯印象。”
在相反方面，复合观念未必与印象相似。我们没见过带翅膀的马而能想像带翅膀的马，但是这个复合观念的构成要素全是由印象来的。印象居先，这件事的证据出于经验；例如，生来瞎眼的人便没有颜色观念。在种种观念当中，保持原印象的相当大程度生动性的观念属于记忆，其它观念属于想像。
休谟主张，当我们持有“人”的观念时，这观念具有“人”的印象所具有的一切个别性质。“心若不对量或质的程度各形成精确概念，就不能形成量或质的任何概念。”“抽象观念不管在代表“印象”时如何变得一般，本身总是个体的。”
这理论是一种近代的唯名论，它有两个缺点，一个是逻辑上的缺点，一个是心理学上的缺点。先说逻辑上的缺点。
休谟讲：“当我们在若干对象中间发现了类似点时，我们把同一个名称加到所有这些对象上。”一切唯名论者都会同意。但是实际上，像“猫”之类的通名，和共相猫一样不实在。唯名论对共相问题的解决，就这样由于应用自己的原则时不够彻底而归于失败；错在把这种原则只用到“事物”上，而不同时用到言语上。
心理学上的缺点至少就休谟方面说比较严重。他所讲的整套理论，把观念看成印象的摹本，其弊病就在于忽略含混性。例如，我见到过一朵什么颜色的花，后来想起它的心像时，这心像缺乏精密性，意思是说有好几种彼此非常类似的色调，它可能是其心像，用休谟的术语讲即“观念”。“心若不对量或质的程度各形成精确概念，就不能形成量或质的任何概念”，这话是不对的。假如你见到过一个身高六尺一寸的男人。你保留下对他的心像，但是这心像对于再高一寸或更矮一寸的人多半也会合适。含混性和一般性不同，但是具有若干同样的特征。休谟由于没注意到含混性，陷入不必要的难局，例如关于下述这件事的难局：是否有可能想像一种从未见过的色调，介乎见过的两种极相似的色调中间。如果这两种色调充分相似，你所能形成的任何心像会同样适用于这两种色调以及中间的色调。休谟说观念来自观念所确切代表的印象，这时候他逸出了心理学的真实情况以外。
2、说一位写作者信息有误，是指他所断言的东西并非事实。在此，他的错误可能源自于知识的缺乏，但是，此类错误不止于此。无论这个错误的原因是什么，该错误本身表现为作出了一个违背事实的断言。写作者将事实上为假的或者概率低的东西，说成是逻辑为真或归纳上概率高的东西。他宣称拥有的知识，事实上他并没有掌握。当然，只有在这种缺陷与写作者的结论相关的时候，此类缺陷才应当指出来。而且，为了支持这种评论，即你反对写作者所提出主张，那么你必须能够论证，你的评判是真实不虚或具有极大可能性。
举个例子，斯宾诺莎（Spinoza）在他的一篇政治文论中，似乎是说，民主政体（democracy）是一种比君主政体（monarchy）更早出现的政府形式。这与政治史公认事实相违悖。斯宾诺莎在这个方面的错误已经影响到他的论证。亚里士多德对于雌性因素在动物繁殖中承担的角色认知有误，因此导致了在生殖过程方面的不靠谱结论。阿奎那（Aquinas）错误地猜测天体物质本质上不同于地球物质，因为他认为前者仅仅是位置的移动，而其他方面则是不可改变的。现代天体物理学修正了这个错误，从而改进了古代及中世纪以来的天文学。不过，这是一种无关紧要的错误。犯下这个错误，并不影响阿奎那形而上学中，关于所有可感觉事物的性质是由材料与形式组成的阐述。
批判性评论的前两点可能相互关联。信息缺失，如我们所见，可能是错误论断的原因。再进一步，无论何时，一个人在某些方面信息有误，那么他也就是在这个方面缺乏信息。但此类缺陷纯粹是消极，或是积极，还是存在不同之处的。相关知识的缺失导致解决某些问题或者支持某些结论变得不可能。然而，错误假设却会推导出错误结论和不靠谱的解决方案。综上所述，这两点都是从作者的前提存在缺陷来指控写作者。他需要比他所拥有的更多的知识。他的论据和理由在数量上或者质量上不够好。
3、说一位写作者“不合逻辑（illogical）”，是说他在推理上犯下了一个逻辑谬误（ fallacy）。一般来说，谬误有两种。有一种是“推不出（non sequitur），意思是指得出的结论根本不能从给出的理由推导出来。另一种叫“不相容事件（occurrence of inconsistency）”，意思是说写作试图讲述的两件事情不能同时为真。无论作出上述哪种评判，阅读者必须能够准确指出写作者的论证在哪个方面说服力不够。人们只有在主要结论受上述缺陷影响时，才会关注该缺陷。一本书在无关紧要的方面说服力不足，也许无伤大雅。
就第三点举例更加困难，因为很少真正的好书在推理上会有明显的失误。当明显失误确实发生时，它们通常都会被处心积虑地掩饰，因而需要具有非常洞察力的阅读者才能发现。不过，我们可以向你展示马基雅维利（Machiavelli）的《君主论》（The Prince）中的一个显而易见的谬误。马基雅维利写道：
“而一切国家，无论是新的国家、旧的国家或者混合国，其主要的基础乃是良好的法律和良好的军队，因为如果没有良好的军队，那时就不可能有良好的法律，同时，如果那里有良好的军队，那时就一定会有良好的法律。”（译文抄自潘汉典译《君主论》1986年版）
在这段话中，单纯根据“良好的法律依靠一支充足警力”这一事实，并不能推导出“哪里的警力充足，则那里的法律也必定良好”。我们暂且忽略第一个论点这个高度可疑性质。我们在此仅对“推不出”谬误感兴趣。要说幸福依赖于健康，也比说良好法律依赖于有效警力更加可信，但也不能由此推导出所有健康的人都过得幸福。
霍布斯的《法律要义》（Elements of Law）中，有一个地方，论证所有物体中除了运动物质的“量（quantities）”，之外再无其他东西。他说，物体世界，根本没有“质（qualities）”。然后，在另外一个地方，他又论证人类就是一个物体，或者只是运动原子体的集合，除此之外，什么也不是。然而，承认感觉存在“质”——颜色、气味、味道，诸如此类——他得出结论，这些只不过是大脑中原子运动而已，再无其他。这个结论与最初采取的立场，即运动中的物体世界没有“质”可言，是不相容的。有关所有运动物体必须适用于他们的任一特定组群的说法，包括大脑原子。
这第三点批评与其他两点相关。当然，一个写作者可能没有推导出他的论据或原理所蕴涵的结论。因此，他的推理是不完整的。但是，在此我们首要关注的情况，是他的推理并非由坚实基础推导而来。从前提本身就不为真，或者论据不足中，发现推理的缺乏说服力，也许很有趣，但不太重要。
一个人，从可靠的前提推导出无效结论，某种意义上说，这也是一种错误信息。但是，把由于推理不当而导致的错误陈述，与我们先前讨论的那种错误陈述区分开来，还是很有必要，后者是由于其他缺陷造成的，尤其是对知识的相关细节了解不够的缺陷。
【英文原文】
Judging the Author’s Soundness
The first three remarks are somewhat different from the fourth, as we will presently see. Let us consider each of them briefly, and then tum to the fourth.
1. To say that an author is uninformed is to say that he lacks some piece of knowledge that is relevant to the problem he is trying to solve. Notice here that unless the knowledge, if possessed by the author, would have been relevant, there is no point in making this remark. To support the remark, you must be able yourself to state the knowledge that the author lacks and show how it is relevant, how it makes a difference to his conclusions.
A few illustrations here must suffice. Darwin lacked the knowledge of genetics that the work of Mendel and later experimentalists now provides. His ignorance of the mechanism of inheritance is one of the major defects in The Origin of Species. Gibbon lacked certain facts that later historical research has shown to have a bearing on the fall of Rome. Usually, in science and history, the lack of information is discovered by later researches. Improved techniques of observation and prolonged investigation make this the way things happen for the most part. But in philosophy, it may happen otherwise. There is just as likely to be loss as gain with the passage of time. The ancients, for example, clearly distinguished between what men can sense and imagine and what they can understand. Yet, in the eighteenth century, David Hume revealed his ignorance of this distinction between images and ideas, even though it had been so well established by the work of earlier philosophers.
2. To say that an author is misinformed is to say that he asserts what is not the case. His error here may be owing to lack of knowledge, but the error is more than that. Whatever its cause, it consists in making assertions contrary to fact. The author is proposing as true or more probable what is in fact false or less probable. He is claiming to have knowledge he does not possess. This kind of defect should be pointed out, of course, only if it is relevant to the author’s conclusions. And to support the remark you must be able to argue the truth or greater probability of a position contrary to the author’s.
For example, in one of his political treatises, Spinoza appears to say that democracy is a more primitive type of government than monarchy. This is contrary to well-ascertained facts of political history. Spinoza’s error in this respect has a bearing on his argument. Aristotle was misinformed about the role that the female factor plays in animal reproduction, and consequently came to unsupportable conclusions about the processes of procreation. Aquinas erroneously supposed that the matter of the heavenly bodies is essentially different from that of terrestrial bodies, because he supposed that the former change only in position, and are otherwise unalterable. Modern astrophysics corrects this error and thereby improves on ancient and medieval astronomy. But here is an error that has limited relevance. Making it does not affect Aquinas’ metaphysical account of the nature of all sensible things as composed of matter and form.
These first two points of criticism may be related. Lack of information, as we have seen, may be the cause of erroneous assertions. Further, whenever a man is misinformed in a certain respect, he is also uninformed in the same respect. But it makes a difference whether the defect is simply negative or positive as well. Lack of relevant knowledge makes it impossible to solve certain problems or support certain conclusions. Erroneous suppositions, however, lead to wrong conclusions and untenable solutions. Taken together, these two points charge an author with defects in his premises. He needs more knowledge than he possesses. His evidences and reasons are not good enough in quantity or quality.
3. To say that an author is illogical is to say that he has committed a fallacy in reasoning. In general, fallacies are of two sorts. There is the non sequitur, which means that what is drawn as a conclusion simply does not follow from the reasons offered. And there is the occurrence of inconsistency, which means that two things the author has tried to say are incompatible. To make either of these criticisms, the reader must be able to show the precise respect in which the author’s argument lacks cogency. One is concerned with this defect only to the extent that the major conclusions are affected by it. A book may safely lack cogency in irrelevant respects.
It is more difficult to illustrate this third point, because few really good books make obvious slips in reasoning. When they do occur, they are usually elaborately concealed, and it requires a very penetrating reader to discover them. But we can show you a patent fallacy in Machiavelli’s The Prince. Machiavelli writes:
The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old, are good laws. As there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws.
Now it simply does not follow from the fact that good laws depend on an adequate police force, that where the police force is adequate, the laws will necessarily be good. We are ignoring the highly questionable character of the first contention. We are only interested in the non sequitur here. It is truer to say that happiness depends on health than that good laws depend on an effective police force, but it does not follow that all who are healthy are happy.
In his Elements of Law, Hobbes argues in one place that all bodies are nothing but quantities of matter in motion. The world of bodies, he says, has no qualities whatsoever. Then, in another place, he argues that man is himself nothing but a body, or a collection of atomic bodies in motion. Yet, admitting the existence of sensory qualities— colors, odors, tastes, and so forth—he concludes that they are nothing but the motions of atoms in the brain. The conclusion is inconsistent with the position first taken, namely, that the world of bodies in motion is without qualities. What is said of all bodies in motion must apply to any particular group of them, including the atoms of the brain.
This third point of criticism is related to the other two. An author may, of course, fail to draw the conclusions that his evidences or principles imply. Thus his reasoning is incomplete. But we are here concerned primarily with the case in which he reasons poorly from good grounds. It is interesting, but less important, to discover lack of cogency in reasoning from premises that are themselves untrue, or from evidences that are inadequate.
A person who from sound premises reaches a conclusion invalidly is, in a sense, misinformed. But it is worthwhile to distinguish the kind of erroneous statement that is owing to bad reasoning from the kind previously discussed, which is owing to other defects, especially insufficient knowledge of relevant details.
